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Abstract
The right of small-scale fishers to participate in governance and management
processes has been increasingly recognised by theorists and policy-makers over the
last thirty years. Political representation is central to the realisation of the right to
participation. In the context of small-scale fisheries, the first level of political
representation is usually located within a spatially or socially defined ‘community’,
where both fisher constituents and representatives are members of that community.
This ‘community-based’ form of political representation requires representatives to
speak and act on behalf of their fisher constituency, mediating the relationship
between their constituency and external actors such as government officials, fisheries
scientists, and fish buyers. The role of mediation or ‘brokerage’ places community-
based representatives in a position of strategic advantage–a position that some
representatives exploit to gain and exercise their own power, instead of protecting and
asserting the interests of their constituency. Community-based political representation
commonly manifests as brokerage, yet this phenomenon receives limited attention in
predominant approaches to fisheries governance theory. Drawing on ethnographic
research conducted in a South African coastal town, this paper seeks to demonstrate,
at a micro-political scale, some of the ways that community-based representation can
be manipulated as an instrument for brokerage by local elites, rather than serving as an
instrument for empowering the livelihoods and democratic participation of small-scale
fishers. The paper concludes by highlighting some of the implications that community-
based representation has for fishing communities, as well as for the practice of fisheries
governance and management. Finally, the paper argues for the necessity of a critical
perspective when theorising fisheries governance processes, so as to confront and
interrogate the strategic practices and asymmetrical power relations by which those
governance processe are decisively shaped.
Introduction–political representation as a potential barrier to democratic
and equitable fisheries governance
Over the last thirty years, fisheries scholars and policy-makers have increasingly
highlighted the importance of including resource users such as small-scale fishers in
policy, legislative and regulatory processes (FAO 1995; Mikalsen & Jentoft 2003; Bene
& Neiland 2006; FAO 2015). This shift is strongly reflected in South Africa, where
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post-apartheid legislative and policy reforms have recognised small-scale fishers’ rights
to participate democratically in the governance and management of the country’s mar-
ine and coastal fisheries resources, and to have equitable access to, and benefits from
those resources. One of the primary mechanisms for small-scale fishers to assert these
rights is that of political representation.
The people and groupings involved in the political representation of small-scale fish-
ers in South Africa are highly diverse (as are the fisher constituencies themselves).1
This paper will therefore focus on ‘community-based political representatives’, defined
broadly here as: people who both reside in and represent a particular spatially defined
community (or a grouping within that community). Community-based political
representatives are generally the representatives who are most closely positioned to
small-scale fishers on the ground–in other words, they are the first level of political
representation for small-scale fishers.
Community-based political representation has been an important instrument for
empowering the livelihoods and democratic participation of many small-scale fishers in
post-apartheid South Africa, but in many communities, this instrument has been
fraught with problems. One of the main problems is that some community-based rep-
resentatives exploit their role to gain and exercise political and economic power, rather
than as a means to communicate the views and advance the interests of their fisher
constituents. In these cases, individuals and groupings residing in marginalised coastal
fishing communities have used community-based political representation as a means to
act as ‘brokers’ between their (usually poorer and less well educated) fisher constitu-
ency or ‘clients’ on the one hand, and external actors such as the state fisheries depart-
ment, development NGOs, and fish buyers on the other hand. Acting as brokers, these
community-based representatives occupy a strategically advantageous position from
which to potentially intercept and benefit from emerging economic opportunities asso-
ciated with the post-apartheid reform of fisheries governance in South Africa.
The phenomenon of community-based representation as brokerage has been exten-
sively documented and theorised in the sociological and anthropological literature on
de-centralisation in non-fisheries contexts such as rural community development, ter-
restrial natural resource governance, and land reform (see for example Ribot 1999;
Abraham & Platteau 2000; Blaikie 2006). This literature reveals the pervasiveness of
instances in which “local elite groups have (re)captured the benefits of decentralization
projects for their own use” (Bene & Neiland 2006: 22). Political anthropologists in
particular have studied and debated his phenomenon extensively since the 1950s, using
the concept of brokerage as a heuristic device to study intermediary actors emergent in
the context of the post-colonial state and international development in Africa, Asia,
and Latin America (Mosse & Lewis 2006). More recently, political anthropogists have
studied the brokerage phenomenon in relation to the neoliberal turn, and the increased
role of non-state actors in governance and the provision of public goods. This unfold-
ing context of neoliberal governance serves to create “mediated cultures of develop-
ment” that “diversify sources of power and influence, via a proliferation of …
intermediary networks”, and in so doing, facilitate the conditions for brokers to “as-
sume growing importance and capture significant resources” (Mosse & Lewis 2006: 2).
The anthopological literature provides abundant ethnographic evidence indicating
that brokers tend to emerge out of “settings of rapid transition” (James 2011: 318),
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“where the state intervenes partly to create conditions where the market will have pri-
macy, but also to ameliorate the resulting inequities through redistributive practices”
(James 2011: 336). Brokers are not only an outcome of the structural conditions that
necessitate their client-constituents’ dependency, but brokers are also agents who per-
petuate those conditions, thus “maintaining the tensions which provide the dynamic of
their actions” (Wolf in Mosse & Lewis 2006: 12). They act as ‘intermediaries’ between
their clients or constituents, and external actors, often at the ‘interfaces’ between differ-
ent actors, practices, discourses, and material resource flows (Mosse & Lewis 2006).
Brokers are “figures of moral uncertainty”, in the sense that they pursue their own
interests (often at the expense of their client-constituents), while at the same time pro-
viding some form of tangible benefits to the latter by facilitating access to resources
and opportunities proferred by state agencies and development NGOs (James 2011:
319). Brokers legitimise their position and practices through a kind of bricolage, adeptly
appropriating and blending multiple (and at times contradictory) identities and
discourses “in relation to their strategic interactions” (James 2011: 321).
In the anthropological literature that focuses specifically on the realm of fisheries, the
theme of representation and intermediaries has also been explored over several
decades. This body of literature suggests that some form of brokerage is a characteris-
tic, even structural feature of small-scale, artisanal fisheries, not least because small-
scale fishers’ knowledge, skill, energy and time is concentrated on the act of catching
fish, and thus, they are commonly compelled to engage with intermediary actors such
as middlemen, fish traders and community-based political representatives (McGoodwin
1980; Petterson 1980; Acheson 1981). Acheson (1981) observes that because “fishermen
are absent so much of the time, they are often unrepresented in the political arena and
are usually dependent on middlemen and ship owners who are often in a position to
exploit them” (1981: 276), but that despite this, fishers in “most parts of the world”
usually have little choice but to enter into client-patron arrangements by establishing
“strong and long-lasting relationships” with middlemen and other intermediary actors
(Acheson 1981: 281).
In contrast, the process of community-based political representation as a form of
brokerage has received less attention in predominant theoretical approaches to fisheries
governance, such as ecosystem-based fisheries management, interactive governance,
and co-management. Referred to collectively here as ‘synergetic governance theory’,
these approaches have sought to inform the development of new de-centred, participa-
tory forms of governance that can respond to the increasing socio-ecological
complexity of coastal and marine fisheries systems.
Though diverse in terms of their ontological, conceptual, and disciplinary
foundations, the theoretical approaches that constitute synergetic fisheries governance
theory are united by their shared valorisation of resource-user participation, combined
with their valorisation of win-win collaboration between multiple state and non-state
partners (thus the term ‘synergetic’). As a consequence of their shared valorisation of
participation and collaborative partnership, synergetic theoretical approaches are also
united by a tendency to downplay the asymetrical power relations and realpolitik prac-
tices that are fundamental in determining the nature and outcomes of fisheries govern-
ance processes (Bene & Neiland 2006; Davis & Ruddle 2012).2 Proponents of
co-management for instance, argue that co-management “seeks to empower the weak
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or less privileged groups in a community to allow them to freely participate in and
collaborate on management” (Berkes et al. 2001: 205). Similarly, scholars advocating for
ecosystem-based fisheries management argue that novel forms of governance are
required which “may involve cooperative, multilevel (rather than centralized) manage-
ment, partnership approaches, social learning and knowledge co-production” (Berkes
2012: 473). Finally, proponents of the interactive governance approach posit an ideal
form of governance called ‘co-governance’: an inclusive process of societal regulation in
which “parties co-operate … without a central or dominating governing actor …”
(Bavinck et al. 2005: 44).
Thus, synergetic theoretical approaches promote a vision of governance that fore-
grounds normative notions of participation and collaborative partnership, at the cost of
eliding the political realities of power, domination, exploitation and contestation. These
approaches seem to take for granted that de-centred political mechanisms such as
community-based political representation generally serve to empower small-scale
fishers, and to strengthen the efficacy of fisheries governance by mediating the engage-
ment between fishers on the ground, and other actors located higher in the chain of
governance. For this reason, synergetic fisheries governance theory has the effect of
predisposing the observer to underestimate or overlook the potential of community-
based representation as a form of brokerage through which local elites are able to
advance their interests, at the expense of their client-constituents . In so doing, a
fundamental element that is latent within community-based representation–a vital link
in the chain of governance–becomes obscured.
To begin addressing this lacuna, this paper explores the phenomenon of community-
based political representation in the context of small-scale fisheries in the South
African coastal town of Ocean View. Drawing on ethnographic research, and elements
from the theoretical framework of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, this paper presents the
micro-political strategies and tactics of brokerage employed by a grouping of residents
who came to occupy the position of dominant fisher representatives in Ocean View.
The paper describes how this group of residents came to occupy this position, and how
they exploited it in order to gain and exercise power, while also capturing economic op-
portunities associated with the post-apartheid reform of small-scale fisheries in South
Africa. In this way, the paper seeks to demonstrate some of the power dynamics and
strategic practices that are obscured or downplayed by synergetic fisheries governance
theory, while reaffirming the need for accountable community-based political represen-
tation, as well as the importance of pursuing a critical approach to the theorisation of
fisheries governance.
Material and methods - ethnography on the Cape Peninsula
This paper is based on Ph.D. research undertaken from January 2011 to December
2012 in the peri-urban coastal town of Ocean View, where ethnographic fieldwork was
conducted through extensive participant-observation, formal and informal interviews,
and a small baseline survey. The town of Ocean View is situated near the southern tip
of South Africa’s Cape Peninsula, roughly 40kms from Cape Town, and bordering the
internationally-renowned Table Mountain National Park (TMNP), with spectacular
views of the Atlantic Ocean, and the surrounding beaches, wetlands and mountains.
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Ocean View was formally established in 1968 under the apartheid-era Group Areas
Act (1950), which mandated the forced relocation of ‘coloured’ communities from
neighbouring areas on the Peninsula to the newly created settlement.3 The town has a
population of roughly 40 000 people, the majority of whom speak Afrikaans as a first
language. Socio-economic conditions in Ocean View are typical of coloured and black
coastal towns along South Africa’s coastline, with unemployment, poverty, and margin-
alisation characterising the lives of a significant percentage of the local population. The
cumulative effect of these conditions is such that many people in Ocean View make
the startling claim that ‘life was better during apartheid’–a claim that is, however, sup-
ported by political economic analysis of neoliberal capitalism in post-apartheid South
Africa (Bond 2003, 2005). Having said this, there are layers of locally-specific, intra-
community class stratification in Ocean View–not everyone lives in dire poverty: there
is a small minority of residents who are well-educated (having completed high school
and tertiary education), and who are employed, or own small businesses, and who
double-storey homes and multiple motor vehicles.
In the context of Ocean View’s economic insecurity, there are roughly 1000 to 1500
residents whose livelihoods rely in some way on participation in the local small-scale
fishery. Many of these residents are among the poorest and most marginalised people
in Ocean View. In 2012, the author and a local resarch assistant conducted a baseline
quantitative survey with 82 Ocean View residents involved in diverse ways in small-
scale fishing. A ‘snowball’ technique was utilised, yielding a sample of survey
participants that was heretogeneous in terms of: age, gender, type of involvement in
small-scale fisheries (harvesting or shore-based activities), sub-sector involvement,
vessel ownership, type of fishing rights held (if any), and organisational affiliation. The
results of the survey indicate that:
 27% of respondents lived in informal shack dwellings;
 75% of the respondents had not completed high school;
 55% of respondents were compelled by economic pressure to harvest marine and
coastal resources to survive, regardless of whether they were in possession of a
fishing quota or permit;
 30% of respondents stated that they skipped meals one or more times per week;
 and 39% of respondents lived in households which depended to some extent on
social grants.
Of those residents involved in fisheries-related activities, roughly between 200 and
300 participate in shore-based post-harvest activities such as marketing and fish clean-
ing, or through the possession of fishing permits and quotas (harvested on their behalf
by those who do personally catch fish). Approximately 800 to 1100 residents are
personally involved in the act of harvesting marine and coastal resources. Veteran
fishers estimate that fewer than 250 residents are legitimate or ‘bona fide’ fishers–a des-
ignation commonly reserved for people whose livelihoods are entirely dependent upon
personally catching local fisheries resources using low levels of technology and capital,
and who are deeply rooted in the local fishing culture.4
The local small-scale fishery itself consists of a fleet of about 25 small motorised ves-
sels (between 5 and 10 m in length), all utilising relatively low levels of technology and
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capital. Local fishers mainly target ‘linefish’ species such as snoek (Thyrsites atun), hot-
tentot (Pachymetopon blochii), and yellowtail (Seriola lalandi), which are caught with
rudimentary hand-lines. They also target west coast rock lobster (WCRL) (Jasus lalan-
dii), a commercially valuable species caught with hoop-nets that are deployed by hand.
Most of the linefish catch is sold to local buyers, who then sell the catch in surrounding
communities, as well as to local fish shops, restaurants and commercial fishing com-
panies. Small portions of the linefish catch (hottentot and snoek in particular) are often
brought home to be consumed by family and friends (Isaacs 2013; Hara 2014). In con-
trast, WCRL catches are almost always sold in their entirety, usually to buyers from
outside the community who have links to commercial fishing companies, with the bulk
of the catch being exported to markets in the Far East. Legal access to the various spe-
cies targeted by local fishers is governed on the basis of individual fishing permits and
quotas allocated by the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF),
which is the national fisheries management agency.
The regulatory system governing fisheries on the Cape Peninsula has undergone two
distinct stages of reform in the post-apartheid period. In the first stage (1994 to 2007),
policy and legislative reform opened political space for small-scale fishers in margina-
lised coastal communities such as Ocean View to gain equitable access to fisheries re-
sources, and to participate in governance and management processes (Isaacs 2006; van
Sittert et al. 2006; Sowman et al. 2014). However, the regulatory system continued to
be largely state-driven, science-centric and oriented towards the interests of industrial
fishing companies, while excluding the majority of small-scale fishers from equitable
access and participation (van Sittert 1995; van Sittert 2002; Sowman 2006).
This exclusion prompted the filing of a class action case in the Western Cape High
Court in 2005, on behalf of small-scale fishers in South Africa.5 In 2007, the High
Court ruled in favour of the Applicants. The Court recognised the rights of small-scale
fishers to the marine commons, and ordered DAFF to provide ‘interim relief ’ to a lim-
ited number of fishers, and to develop a policy that would address the specific needs of
this resource-user group (Sowman et al. 2014).6 Through the combination of the 'Policy
for the Small-Scale Fisheries Sector in South Africa (SSF Policy)' (DAFF 2012) and in-
terim relief (currently the de facto foundation of Ocean View’s small-scale fisheries),
new opportunities have emerged for people in disadvantaged coastal communities to
benefit economically from South Africa’s fisheries resources. These emerging opportun-
ities have attracted many newcomers to small-scale fisheries, and as a consequence,
there is increasing competition to access and benefit from local fisheries resources. De-
mand for brokers has increased radically in reponse to these developments, as margina-
lised coastal community members seek the assistance of fellow community members
who “specialise in the acquisition, control and re-distribution of development revenue”
(Mosse & Lewis 2006: 12). It is in this context that the micro-politics of community-
based representation as brokerage have emerged and are playing out.
Results and discussion–the micro-politics of community-based fisher repre-
sentation in Ocean View
Community-based political representation in Ocean View is composed of a fluid and
complicated arrangement of individuals, organisations, and practices. There are at least
six groupings claiming to represent members of the local fishing community, and the
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interrelation between these groupings is characterised by a high degree of tension and
conflict–as one local veteran fisher put it: “there’s too many organisations!” The role of
these representative groupings, is ostensibly to assert the views and interests of small-
scale fishers in governance and management processes, though some also conduct
other important tasks on behalf of their membership, such as marketing, facilitating
rights applications, and providing general administrative support. These groupings are
largely driven by a few individuals who have a loosely identifiable constituency within
Ocean View’s small-scale fishing community. The relationship between the
community-based representatives and those they claim to represent varies considerably
in terms of:
 the formality of the relationship;
 the degree of autonomy and responsiveness exercised by each representative;
 the representative’s knowledge of their constituency;
 the representative’s personal fishing experience;
 the alignment or conflict between their interests;
 and the relations of power between them.
To make sense of some of these complex dynamics between small-scale fishers and
community-based representatives in Ocean View, this paper employs the anthropo-
logical concept of the ‘broker’ discussed in the introduction, combined with Pierre
Bourdieu’s (1986, 1989) sociological concepts of field and capitals. In crude summary,
‘field’ refers to a distinct social space within which a particular set of relations and prac-
tices unfold. Fields are multi-dimensional, encompassing structure and agency, material
and symbolic phenomena, as well as the interplay between these different dimensions.
Though fields are distinct microcosms with their own logics, they do not exist in a vac-
uum, but instead are situated hierarchically within broader fields, and with sub-fields
embedded within them (Bourdieu 1989). Crucially, the structure of a particular field is
determined by the balance of forces–or the configuration of power relations–inhering
in the field. People are empowered or disempowered in different ways depending on
the position they occupy in the field, while at the same time, they act to either reinforce
or challenge the field’s structure, and thereby protect or improve their position
(Bourdieu 1989). In Bourdieu’s (2005: 31) words: “a field is a field of forces within
which the agents occupy positions … The agents react to these relations of force, to
these structures … while being, therefore, constrained by the forces inscribed in these
fields and being determined by these forces … they are able to act upon these fields”.
This accords neatly with James' (2011: 335) suggestion that the broker is both “product
and producer”. It should noted here that Bourdieu’s agonistic ontology of the social
world is consciously employed here as a valuable and necessary counter to the norma-
tive valorisation of collaborative engagement by synergetic fisheries governance theory.
In terms of the focus of this paper, the principal field is the ‘field of small-scale fisher-
ies in Ocean View’. This field is ‘symbolic’, in the sense that it is constituted by the rela-
tionships, ideologies, cultural knowledge and discursive practices of local fishers and
community-based representatives. At the same time, this field is also ‘material’, in the
sense that it is constituted by the Cape Peninsula’s coastal ecosystem and fisheries re-
sources, and by Ocean View's small-scale fishing activities and economics. The
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structure of the field is defined in part, by the asymmetrical power relations between
and among fishers and representatives, and these power relations determine which
community members gain access to fishing rights and other benefits granted by the
state. Depending on their position in the field, fishers and representatives act to
reinforce, contest, or harness the power asymmetries inherent in the field of small-scale
fisheries in Ocean View.
When acting within this field, individual fishers and representatives draw on their
own particular set of ‘capitals’, which can be described as material and symbolic powers
(and which generally correspond with an actor’s field position). Capitals can be accu-
mulated, utilised or depleted, and manifest variously in the form of knowledge, skills
and resources that fishers and representatives draw on to reinforce or improve their
position in the field. In crude synopsis, the principal categories of capitals are ‘social
capital’ (networks of social relationships), ‘economic capital’ (money or property), and
‘cultural capital’ (emic knowledge and skill) (Bourdieu 1986). ‘Cultural capital’ can be
described as a body of knowledge, skills, and, discursive practices accumulated through
an emic process of “total, early, imperceptible learning”, which occurs from “the earliest
days of life” (Bourdieu 1986: 47).7 Though cultural capital is founded upon emic and
‘imperceptible’ learning, this paper will demonstrate that it can also be accumulated
vicariously by outsiders through strategic appropriation, and consequently, exploited
for political and economic gain.
Two specific kinds of cultural capital are fundamental in shaping community-based
representation within the field of small-scale fisheries in Ocean View. The first is cul-
tural capital that is specific to the local fisheries field, and which consists of knowledge
and skills associated with the harvesting of fisheries species (including fishing practices,
discourses, local ecological dynamics). The second form is cultural capital in the wider
‘bureaucratic field’, or more simply: officialdom. This kind of cultural capital consists of
knowledge and skills that are largely accumulated through formal education, including
the capacities of reading, writing, numeracy, and verbal communication (with compe-
tency in English being of particular strategic importance).
Most community-based representatives have low levels of cultural capital in the
fisheries field, when compared with their fisher constituents, who generally have a vast
body of knowledge and skill relating to local fishing practices and ecological dynamics
that has been accumulated through years of direct personal experience, and through in-
culcation by family and close social relationships. In contrast to these fishers, the ma-
jority of community-based representatives participate exclusively in shore-based
activities relating to political representation, administration and marketing support.
These ‘non-fisher’ representatives do not personally harvest fisheries species (often
having only entered the local fisheries field relatively recently), and they have limited
personal experience, knowledge and skills with regard to local fishing practices and
social dynamics.
However, non-fisher representatives in Ocean View generally possess more cultural
capital in the bureaucratic field, when compared with the fishers they represent. Non--
fisher representatives typically have stronger reading, writing, numeracy and verbal
communication skills, and a better grasp of the English language than their fisher con-
stituents do, making these representatives more equipped to navigate the world of offi-
cialdom. Many fishers encountered during this research referred to these non-fisher
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representatives using the ironic terms ‘literate’ or ‘clever’ people. Nevertheless, despite
these negative perceptions, the possession of this ‘bureaucratic’ form of cultural capital
was a primary reason why community-based representatives were endorsed by many
local fishers, and others involved (in some way) in local fisheries-related activities - it
was a set of knowledge, practices and discourses with which they were not adept, but
whose strategic utility they recognised.
This recognition affirms Acheson’s (1981) observation about the common reliance of
fishers around the world upon intermediary actors (whether marketers or community-
based representatives) to act on their behalf in relation to matters for which they have
neither the time, energy, knowledge or practical ability. For small-scale fishers in South
Africa, the value of cultural capital in the bureaucratic field has appreciated during the
post-apartheid period, primarily because the administrative burden that fishers bear in
order to continue practicing their livelihoods and culture has increased as a conse-
quence of small-scale fisheries becoming more formalised and regulated (see Hersoug
& Isaacs 2001; Hauck & Kroese 2006). Crucially, the bureaucratisation of fishing has
precipitated a significant increase in the amount of administrative paperwork required
to apply for fishing permits and quotas. However, many of Ocean View’s fishers (par-
ticularly the more senior fishers) find formal documents intimidating and difficult to
decipher. Nevertheless, they are compelled to engage with these bureaucratic artefacts
in order to pursue their livelihoods, and thereby sustain themselves and their families.
As a result, these fishers are forced to rely on the assistance of ‘clever’ third parties
such as community-based representatives who possess the requisite form of cultural
capital. This places fishers in a position of vulnerability, while placing community-
based representatives in a position of strategic advantage–an advantage that some
representatives exploit to gain and exercise power over their constituents.
The asymmetries in cultural capital between small-scale fishers and their representa-
tives are compounded by asymmetries in economic capital. More specifically, many
community-based representatives in Ocean View have greater access to economic
capital than their constituency. According to local fishers, this economic capital is con-
stituted by the representatives’ personal financial wealth, as well as being sourced from
marketing agents outside of the community who work for large fishing companies
(Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 20/02/12; Veteran Fisher 13, pers comm 13/07/12; Fisher
6, pers comm 24/10/12).8
In a context of structural poverty, community-based representatives who have rela-
tively privileged access to economic capital are able to exert a degree of influence (and
even control) over their constituency, most notably through the provision of monetary
loans and advances (see below). Economic capital also provides some representatives
with a strategic advantage over other representatives in Ocean View - those representa-
tives who can afford telephones, internet connections and transport are able to
discharge their duties more effectively than those representatives who have very limited
access to economic capital.
To explore the micro-politics of community-based fisher representation in greater
detail, the discussion now turns to one of the most prominent representative
organisations operating within the fractured and volatile Ocean View, referred to here
as the Association of Ocean View Fishers (AOF).9 Attention is focused on the AOF
leadership, not only because of the influential role they played in the field of small-
Schultz Maritime Studies  (2017) 16:7 Page 9 of 21
scale fisheries in Ocean View, but also, more fundamentally, because their strategic
actions provide a case study that illustrates with stark clarity how community-based
political representation has the potential to serve as a brokerage mechanism for local
elites to gain and exercise further power, often at the expense of the livelihoods and
democratic rights of local small-scale fishers.
The AOF was formally established in 2005 by three closely linked residents who serve
as the leadership of the organisation. These residents, referred to here as AOF Rep 1,
AOF Rep 2, and AOF Rep 3, originally established the organisation to meet the local
demand among fishers for consultants who could navigate the increasingly complicated
bureaucratic maze of commercial fishing rights application processes. Over time, the
AOF leadership also became actively involved in the interim relief system (AOF Rep 2,
pers comm 28/09/12). Many of the AOF’s roughly 100 loosely aligned members were
relative newcomers to fisheries (roughly less than ten years involvement). The majority
of members were interim relief permit holders, but several members had commercial
fishing rights for linefish, WCRL and abalone.
The AOF leadership positioned themselves as being embedded in the culture, rela-
tionships and practices of Ocean View’s small-scale fishing community. AOF Rep 2 had
resided in Ocean View for more than 40 years, and stated that he was involved in fish-
eries since the age of 16, and that both his late parents had participated directly in local
fishing activities. AOF Rep 1 and AOF Rep 3 made similar claims - according to AOF
Rep 3: “I’m coming from a fishing community, I have lived there all my life” (AOF Rep
3, pers comm, 29/03/11).
AOF Rep 1was the executive chairperson, and the most prominent of the AOF lead-
ership, conducting most of the daily work of running the organisation and representing
its members. AOF Rep 2 played a principal but less formal and conspicuous role in the
grouping, while AOF Rep 3 provided organisational and representational support. The
AOF leadership conducted a number of activities in their role as community-based
fisher representatives. These activities included political representation in fisheries
governance and management processes, as well as more practical services such as
negotiating marketing agreements, and providing administrative support.
At the time of this research, AOF Rep 1 and AOF Rep 3 were formally recognised by
DAFF to represent interim relief fishers in Ocean View. According to her colleague,
AOF Rep 1 attended weekly meetings with DAFF officials, and reported back to AOF
members on an equally regular basis (AOF Rep 2, pers comm 28/09/12). As AOF Rep
2 explained, he and his colleagues had considerable social capital in the form of close
working relationships with high level officials: “we sit down with government …” (AOF
Rep 2, pers comm 28/09/12). AOF Rep 2 emphasised that the AOF leadership’s rela-
tionships with government officials enabled them to access considerably more informa-
tion about fisheries governance processes than other representatives in Ocean View. He
claimed that the AOF leadership honoured their obligation to their constituency by
transmitting relevant information in a regular and transparent manner: “the right infor-
mation is being passed down”. He also explained that the AOF leadership had started
sharing information with fishers outside of their constituency: “we used to have closed
meetings, but now we have more open meetings” (AOF Rep 2, pers comm 28/09/12).
The AOF leadership’s efficacy as fisher representatives was also based on their exten-
sive cultural capital in the bureaucratic field. For instance, AOF Rep 1 had strong
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literacy, communication and administrative skills compared with most of the fishers
she represented–as AOF Rep 2 observed: “because of the work she used to do … she’s
a bit more … brainy… the fishermen respect her”, adding proudly that she was ad-
dressed by members as “Ma’am”. Instrumental to this ‘trust’ and ‘respect’ was the AOF
leadership’s ability to harness their particular set of capitals to produce tangible results
for their members. The AOF leadership was consistently able to: negotiate favourable
marketing agreements, issue monetary loans, and secure access to fishing permits and
quotas. As AOF Rep 2 described, this proven track record is what made the AOF par-
ticularly successful in relation to other representative organisations in Ocean View. He
argued that fishers in Ocean View were awakening to the fact that the AOF produces
concrete results, but that some fishers remained with other community-based represen-
tatives such as the Democratic Fishers Organisation (DFO) out of stubborn loyalty.10
He asserted that this loyalty was to their own detriment, because these representatives
could not provide tangible benefits for their members in the way that the AOF could.
According to AOF Rep 2, these fishers were being negatively affected by their contin-
ued allegiance to “the same people that make them dead by the department”. In con-
trast, he argued that: “our fishers are empowered!” (AOF Rep 2, pers comm 28/09/12).
As the eventual implementation of the SSF Policy is widely anticipated to create the
conditions for the development of local fishing operations, the AOF leadership plans to
move towards supplying all of the Ocean View fishing community’s fisheries-related
needs, including fishing gear, vessel maintenance and repair, assistance with fishing
rights applications, marketing, administration, as well as support with the development
of new institutional arrangements being introduced by the government (such as co-
operatives and community-based fishing rights). In AOF Rep 2’s words, the vision of
the AOF leadership is to become “service providers for my community” (AOF Rep 2,
pers comm 28/09/12).
As Mosse and Lewis (2006) and James (2011) emphasise, brokers are adept at the stra-
tegic adoption and self-portrayal of disparate identities, discourses, and practices, so as to
legitimise their activities. In this case, the AOF leadership portrayed themselves as legitim-
ate political representatives deeply rooted in the culture and practices of the local fishing
community, this self-portrayal conflicted in many ways with the empirical evidence, and
was strongly contested by local fishers who were former AOF members, and by local fish-
ers unaffiliated to the AOF, the majority of whom would be considered ‘bona fide fishers’
by even the most stringent criteria. Indeed, the research was saturated with data support-
ing a counter narrative to the one presented by the AOF leadership. Contrary to their
own claims, AOF Rep 1 and AOF Rep 2 only became formally involved in the local fisher-
ies field in 2004, when they both retired after nearly thirty years of permanent employ-
ment in relatively low-level government positions.11 Furthermore, the AOF leadership’s
involvement in fisheries-related activities was exclusively shore-based: they did not
personally harvest fisheries species for their livelihood, and in this sense, could not be
described as ‘fishers’ (though AOF Rep 2 occasionally skippered one of the AOF’s vessels).
A respected fishing veteran in Ocean View observed that the AOF leadership “don’t know
the fishers”, and that “AOF Rep 2 … comes out of a government job … now he thinks he’s
the boss of the beach! He’s not a fisherman!” (Veteran Fisher 1, pers comm 02/11/12).
There was also consensus among knowledgeable and experienced non-AOF fishers in
Ocean View that the AOF leadership did not engage with, or represent their
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constituency in a democratic manner. Indeed, the AOF leadership had a kind of ‘strategic-
ally paternalistic’ approach to their constituency, affirming the moral ambiguity of broker-
age, and the way brokers are able to “cobble together a collection of divergent discourse
and practices” (James 2011: 327), in this case an uneasy blend of authoritarianism and (os-
tensibly) responsive, democratic representation. As AOF Rep 1 argued at a DAFF commu-
nity meeting in 2013: “they’re [fishers] not business people … they need to move with
people they can trust” (AOF Rep 1, pers comm 19/08/13). AOF Rep 2 also claimed that
the AOF’s members trusted the leadership to such an extent that they would routinely
state: “we don’t want to ask questions” (AOF Rep 2, pers comm 28/09/12).
Many fishers in Ocean View argued that this strategic paternalism reflected the AOF
leadership’s contempt for their constituency. One of the most esteemed veteran fishers
on the Cape Peninsula (who was an Applicant in the Equality Court class action, and
who was not affiliated to the AOF) described how AOF Rep 1 once told him “you [fish-
ers] must just go to sea, and let us talk, because you don’t have the right mind-set for
this sort of thing”. According to him, AOF Rep 1’s implied reasoning behind this state-
ment was “because you are incompetent” (Veteran Fisher 17, pers comm 09/02/12).12
For fishers such this, the AOF leadership’s strategic paternalism subverted the demo-
cratic rights of AOF members, and opened the way for their exploitation.
A significant proportion of fishers in Ocean View therefore described the AOF as a
‘household forum’, or ‘kitchen committee’–colloquial terms for a local organisation run
by, and in the interests of a small group of tightly-connected individuals (sometimes
kin relations). More specifically, these fishers perceived the AOF leadership as a local
elite grouping who sought to capture the position of community-based political repre-
sentatives, and thereby to capture economic opportunities emerging in the local field of
small-scale fisheries (such as those associated with the interim relief and SSF Policy
processes). Given the gravity of these claims, it should be emphasised here that the
validity of these counter claims were rigorously assessed and confirmed in relation to
the weight of the data collected, and through a systematic process of triangulation con-
ducted on the basis of prolonged, in-depth interaction with a large and heterogeneous
sample of Ocean View residents. The critique of the AOF leadership was often articu-
lated most clearly by respected veteran fishers, in part because their elevated status in
the Ocean View fishing community offered a measure of social protection:
 “AOF Rep 1 and AOF Rep 2 were working for all these years for the government …
then when this thing came in [post-apartheid reform of fishing rights allocations]
then they left all of that … now they’re the main … they’re the fish organisation–
everything” (Veteran Fisher 13, pers comm 13/07/12);
 “they’re like sharks … they just eat you up” (Veteran Fisher 7, pers comm 02/07/12).
 “we used to belong to them [AOF] … but as I said … the misconduct that went on
there … now someone else sits with the bread! But anyway … I don’t want to talk
too much … in case they eat me up” (Veteran Fisher 1, pers comm 02/11/12).
 “those people are just out for themselves … they’re stirring Ocean View up … how
did they come into their position?” (Veteran Fisher 13, pers comm 13/07/12).
To understand how the AOF leadership was able to occupy and exploit the position
of dominant community-based representatives in Ocean View, it is necessary to
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consider the inter-related strategies and tactical manoeuvres through which they con-
structed an appearance of legitimacy for themselves. These strategies included: i) the
accumulation and exploitation of cultural and social capital in fisheries and civic
engagement; ii) the building of a large constituency of ‘bona fide’ and thus legitimate fish-
ers; iii) and facilitating the entry of non-fishers into Ocean View’s small-scale fishery.
Speaking at a DAFF community meeting in Ocean View in 2013, AOF Rep 1 ex-
plained that: “fishing is a tradition, an inheritance” (AOF Rep 1, pers comm 22/03/13).
In the context of small-scale fisheries governance in South Africa, representatives
would routinely make claims to this ‘tradition’ or ‘inheritance’ as a means to legitimise
their role as a representative of small-scale fishers. To this end, the AOF leadership
employed the strategy of accumulating fisheries-specific cultural capital in order to bol-
ster their claims to be rooted in the local culture and practices of fishing, and thus to
be legitimate representatives. This strategy involves interacting with those who are em-
bedded in the local fishing community, with the purpose of extracting information
about local fishing-related practices, beliefs, values, history, social relations, and
discourses. Through this strategy, the AOF leadership was able to accumulate, and sub-
sequently demonstrate to outsiders (such as DAFF officials) the requisite amount of
fisheries-specific cultural capital, creating the impression of being deeply embedded
members of the local fishing community whom they represented.
Several research participants in Ocean View observed this vicarious accumulation of
cultural capital. During one interview, a non-fisher resident in his early sixties (whose
son had an abalone quota), described how “clever people” had visited fisher households
in Ocean View “to take people’s histories” for their own opportunistic purposes (Non-
Fisher 1, pers comm 02/07/12). One of the established women fishers in Ocean View
also described how AOF Rep 1 had exploited the identity and heritage of fishers in
Ocean View, exclaiming that: “she’s using our legacy to elevate herself!” (Fisher 2, pers
comm 22/10/12). Affirming this claim, a veteran fisher (whose 82 year old mother was
the most senior retired woman fisher in Ocean View) observed that the local fishing
culture was increasingly being viewed as a strategic resource, arguing that “it’s only
now” that non-fishers are eager to claim this heritage:
“now there’s new people coming in, they want to give people the impression that
they knew all these things from the past. And what happens is … they come to my
mother, they come to people, and they ask questions, they [fishers] start talking, she
wants to share. And then they use that same information for their [fishing right]
applications, as the knowledge she had … What gets you normally is, when they say
the amount of years they’ve been involved in the industry. And which you know it’s
not the truth, because you know where the person comes from … how can you have
been for 25 years in the [fishing] industry, but you were 20 years in another
industry?!” (Veteran Fisher 3, pers comm 22/06/12).
It was also apparent that the AOF leadership had employed the strategy of accumu-
lating cultural capital and social capital in the broader field of civic engagement. Several
research participants in Ocean View indicated that the AOF leadership were involved
in a number of local civic structures related to community housing and social develop-
ment: as Veteran Fisher 5, a local fisher and representative: “Whatever you start, people
like them latch onto it” (Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 03/02/12). He explained that the
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AOF leadership’s civic engagement has enabled them to accumulate knowledge about
community-based representation, to establish their identity as ‘community leaders’, and
to build their social networks within the field of civic engagement. Through this
process cultural and social capital accumulation, the AOF leadership’s position as
community-based representatives has become institutionalised, giving them a veneer of
legitimacy to those without detailed knowledge of Ocean View’s community politics.
Claiming to represent a large constituency of bona fide fishers was another key strat-
egy employed by the AOF leadership, and other community-based representatives as a
means to support their own claims to legitimacy. Recognition of this claim by actors
outside of the community provides a rich strategic resource for representatives, poten-
tially facilitating their inclusion in fisheries governance processes, and enabling them to
exercise a degree of political leverage in those processes. As one fisher explained in re-
gard to AOF Rep 2’s use of this strategy: “the more people he can send to the depart-
ment, the stronger he is” (Veteran Fisher 14, pers comm 13/07/12). There are also
financial opportunities that emerged from representing a large number of people. The
AOF leadership were known to charge a fee for securing interim relief permits and
commercial fishing rights, negotiating marketing arrangements, and for conducting
general administrative services on their behalf for their members–according to one vet-
eran fisher: “it’s about money” (Veteran Fisher 16, pers comm 09/02/12).
In their strategic endeavour to build the size of their ‘constituency’, the AOF leader-
ship utilised a number of tactics. The first was the tactical use of information. In their
role as mediators of the flow of information between their constituency and other ac-
tors (such as government officials, industry representatives, NGOs and fisheries scien-
tists), the AOF leadership were well positioned to mediate this flow of information in
accordance with their own interests and agendas. This advantage was multiplied in a
context of information scarcity, as Veteran Fisher 5 argued: “There’s no direction com-
ing from DAFF, and this is sowing confusion in communities” (Veteran Fisher 5, pers
comm 15/06/12). Given that this research was conducted during a period of dramatic
change in South African fisheries policy and legislation, the lack of communication
from DAFF officials had contributed to deep and widespread uncertainty among fishers
in Ocean View regarding processes that fundamentally affected their lives. In the words
of one fisher: “information is very important! If you don’t get the information, you don’t
know what’s going on” (Fisher 1, pers comm 03/07/12).
In this context, information was a valuable commodity, and a powerful political tool.
With their formal and informal access to, and relationships with government officials, the
AOF leadership was able to obtain information which they used to increase their constitu-
ency, and to build and exercise reinforce power over them. It was often observed by re-
search participants in Ocean View that fishers would gravitate towards those
representatives who had more information–as Veteran Fisher 5 put it, “fishers migrate ac-
cording to which community organisation has information. Even if that information is in-
correct or distorted … just as long as that organisation has something to tell” (Veteran
Fisher 5, pers comm 09/04/12). One fisher (aligned to the DFO) argued that it was com-
mon knowledge in the Ocean View fishing community that the AOF leadership had the
most information regarding the formation of co-operatives. However, he described his
unsuccessful attempt to obtain some of this information from them, exclaiming in frustra-
tion: “they’re holding it tight!” (Fisher 3, pers comm 23/10/12). Two veteran fishers (who
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were affiliated to the DFO) also noted that on several occasions during 2011 and 2012,
they had attempted to attend the AOF’s meetings to seek information about co-
operatives, interim relief, and the SSF Policy, but were told that non-members were not
allowed to attend (Veteran Fisher 11, 12, pers comm 24/06/12).
The AOF leadership’s ability to produce tangible results was central to their strategy
of expanding their constituency, and was particularly valuable given the widespread
economic insecurity experienced by people in Ocean View. Here we see an instance of
the moral ambiguity that surrounds the broker. Though relations of “personalized de-
pendence” undermine the autonomy of the client-constituent, brokers do “promise
plausible opportunities for their followers” (James 2011: 327).
According to several non-members, one of the main tactics employed by the AOF
leadership to produce tangible results (and thereby build their constituency) was that of
the monetary advance–a common feature of small-scale fisheries internationally, and
referred to in Afrikaans by fishing communities along the southern and western coast
of South Africa as a ‘voorskot’ (Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 23/09/11; Fisher 1, pers
comm 03/07/12; Veteran Fisher 3, pers comm 14/07/12). A ‘voorskot’ usually takes the
form of an advance on the money a fisher expects to earn from their commercial fish-
ing right or interim relief permit, and is usually paid during the off-season, when many
fishers are financially desperate, and thus vulnerable. My research assistant described
his perception of the power of the voorskot as employed by the AOF leadership: “It’s
like they’ve brought this fast track … they are able to bail people out … to bring quick
solutions to people’s immediate needs … And that’s what people in our situation need
now in South Africa” (Research Assistant, pers comm 22/06/12). The use of the voors-
kot tactic appears to have contributed to the AOF’s strategy of building their constitu-
ency, while simultaneously establishing a debtor-creditor relationship through which to
impose obligations of loyalty, and to defend against dissent. As one veteran fisher
explained in relation to the AOF leadership’s use of the voorskot: “Yes … it’s money
that talks” (Veteran Fisher 14, pers comm 13/07/12).
The AOF leadership also had a proven ability to produce tangible results by securing
commercial fishing rights and interim relief permits (indeed, they each had an individ-
ual commercial fishing right). Since the Equality Court case in 2007, they focused their
efforts on interim relief–both AOF members and non-members expressed the view that
if someone desired an interim relief permit, their chances were significantly improved if
they sought the AOF leadership’s assistance. One veteran fisher observed how AOF
Rep 2 had gathered people into the AOF fold with the promise of securing interim
relief permits on their behalf: “Yes …then he walks with books … he drives around the
area, then he goes to the homes … ‘man, you can get something [a permit]’” (Veteran
Fisher 13, pers comm 13/0/712). Another veteran fisher described similar observations:
“they’re just scratching [people] together. They drive around the area, they’ve got lots
of money to buy petrol, and all that … he drives … to go collect people” (Veteran
Fisher 1, 02/11/12). A young linefisher concurred with these observations, adding that
the AOF leadership exploited the emotive discourses of ‘community’ and ‘empower-
ment’ in their efforts to convince fishers of the potential of co-operatives: “they promise
you through the heart, and through the mouth” (Fisher 4, pers comm 23/10/12).
Despite the scepticism among bona fide fishers in Ocean View, the AOF leadership’s
claims have found a more sympathetic audience in the form of non-fisher residents in
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Ocean View who are attracted by the economic opportunities emerging in relation to
co-operatives, and the allocation of fishing quotas and permits. By formally assisting
non-fisher residents to pursue these opportunities, the AOF leadership has been able,
not only to enlarge their constituency, but also to secure private economic gains for
themselves. At a DAFF community meeting in August 2013, AOF Rep 1 argued
strongly that “we must prioritise bona fide fishers!” (AOF Rep 1, pers comm 19/08/13).
However, in their effort to expand their constituency, and to capture greater benefits
from their position as representatives, the AOF leadership appeared not to have dis-
criminated between those people who were fully dependent on personally harvesting
marine resources for a living, and those who had little or no personal involvement in
fisheries. By securing commercial fishing rights and interim relief permits for people
who did not fish, the AOF leadership were alleged to have secured economic benefits
for themselves, while facilitating the entry of non-fishers into the local field of small-
scale fisheries at the expense of many bona fide fishers in Ocean View.
In the context of interim relief and the SSF Policy, the entry point for non-fishers is
the verification process, whereby prospective permit applicants are required to ‘prove’
their credentials as ‘bona fide fishers’, in accordance with the government’s policy focus
on restoring the rights of small-scale fishers who had been excluded by the MLRA and
apartheid era fisheries policies. The fisher verification process illustrates precisely what
James (2011) has documented in relation brokerage and rural land reform in South
Africa: in essense, the post-apartheid state’s developmental and re-distributionist ap-
proach has entailed the creation of “new edifices of social engineering” which categorise
“people into types and proposed corresponding kinds of property ownership”, and
thereby constructing “new spaces and new repetoires for entrepreneurial brokerage”
(James 2011: 321). These constructed categories “are productive of new social, cultural
and poltiical identities as well as acting upon pre-existing ones” (2011: 327), enabling
the “recruiting by elites” (in this case the AOF leadership) of “strategically mobilized
groups” (James 2011: 325). During a road show to discuss the implementation of the
SSF Policy, one DAFF management official explained that:
“We will have to look very closely at who is a small-scale fisher … Let me be very
clear, we intend to target fisher folk, who’ve made a living from the sea”, this is “not
for the lawyers, doctors, teachers … Because of the financial benefits people have
been seeing in these processes, people are infiltrating and causing chaos … and only
for their own benefit” (DAFF Director 1, pers comm 19/08/13).
One fisher observed that representatives who resided in the community–and thus par-
ticipated in verification–had an incentive to endorse their own members in verification
meetings, because they would later take a percentage of the price per kilogram arranged
on behalf of those members: “the more people you can control, the better for you” (Fisher
13, pers comm 09/02/12). Another fisher alleged that AOF Rep 1 and AOF Rep 2 had
been submitting verification lists composed largely of non-fishers: “they just want to go
for the numbers … you want to run as many people as possible” (Veteran Fisher 16, pers
comm 09/02/12). Echoing the views of fishers who did not belong to the AOF, one fisher
described the AOF leadership’s modus operandi: “they want your vote, they want your
name, and then they take it from there …”, however, he stressed that “it’s only a fisherman
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who can identify a fisherman … we all know each other … we know ‘he is catching fish’”
(Fisher 1, pers comm 03/07/12).
The indiscriminate facilitation of access to commercial fishing rights and interim re-
lief permits by the AOF leadership contributed towards the broader trend in Ocean
View, in which fishing has become an increasingly attractive option as a source of
income in a context of structural poverty and unemployment. As one veteran fisher
explained: “Look, like here in Ocean View, here there’s almost 2000 fishermen who
aren’t fishermen, where do they come from? … The whole of Ocean View is now full …
just fishermen … but they’re not fishermen!” (Veteran Fisher 13, pers comm 13/07/12).
Another veteran fisher argued that “the department, the government just gives to
everybody, it’s not, in a sense, just purely for fishermen …” (Veteran Fisher 3, pers
comm 22/06/12). A local trek fisher also observed that “nowadays, everyone wants to
be a fisher … The department made one mistake, by giving the wrong people permits.
Now the clever people come in … it’s not [supposed to be] about literacy, it’s about giv-
ing people a fair chance” (Fisher 1, pers comm 03/07/12). This claim was affirmed by a
veteran fisher, who claimed that: “Now they’re smuggling themselves in … now that
they hear about the quotas, they come, everybody comes … They apply for quotas, and
they get it … and my friend here [Veteran Fisher 2] sits with nothing …” (Veteran
Fisher 1, pers comm 02/11/12).
There was consensus among these and other non-AOF fishers encountered during
this research that the majority of the AOF’s membership was composed of non-fishers.
Some veteran fishers mentioned going on several occasions to AOF meetings, only to
be told that non-members were not allowed. From the doorway, they claimed to have
observed a significant percentage of non-fishers present at these meetings (Veteran
Fisher 11, 12, pers comm 24/06/12). It was also alleged that the AOF leadership “say
they’re representing fishers, but who are the fishers they’re representing?” (Fisher 1,
pers comm 03/07/12). One veteran fisher explained that, as a highly knowledgeable
and experienced fisher, he was not recognised or taken seriously at AOF meetings:
“Yes, I was already at the meetings. But those meetings of the AOF, I don’t worry about
them anymore … what will I do with myself sitting there? You don’t even get seen”
(Veteran Fisher 15, pers comm 13/07/12).
Conclusion–community-based political representation as brokerage: implica-
tions for fisheries governance
The Ocean View case reveals some of the micro-political practices and power dynamics
that constitute the latent ‘dark side’ of community-based political representation. It also
highlights the conditions conducive to its manifestation, which arise largely from the
introduction of political and economic opportunities into a community context of
structural poverty, conflict, asymmetrical power relations, and minimal democratic ac-
countability. In the hands of a local elite grouping in Ocean View, community-based
representation became an instrument of brokerage utilised to gain and exercise power,
rather than serving as an instrument for empowering their constituency and the
broader fishing community. The AOF leadership harnessed their specific set of material
and symbolic capitals in pursuit of a range of strategies and tactics, with the aim of
fabricating a foundation for their claims to be legitimate representatives. In so doing,
they manoeuvred themselves into the position of dominant community-based fisher
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representatives in Ocean View, and from this position, were able to intercept economic
benefits intended to flow to their constituents and the broader fishing community.
As the Ocean View case demonstrates, when community-based representation
manifests as a form of brokerage practiced by local elites, it tends to undermine the
democratic rights of constituents and non-constituents alike. The ability of constituents
(whether fishers or non-fishers) to engage with government officials and other external
actors can easily be compromised by the opaque mediation of community-based ‘bro-
ker-representatives’, who distort the communication of information between constitu-
ents and external actors. At the same time, non-constituent fishers are also negatively
affected because broker-representatives are often in a sufficiently dominant position to
monopolise information flowing from fisheries management officials and other external
actors into the broader fishing community. Furthermore, power asymmetries and a lack
of formal mechanisms for democratic accountability mean that constituents are unable
to ensure that broker-representatives operate in a transparent and responsive manner.
Consequently, the lack of democracy makes it possible for community-based broker-
representatives to subvert local fishers’ economic interests. Here the ambiguous effects
of broker-representation becomes clear. On one hand, the AOF leadership provided
tangible economic benefits to their constituents, securing a source of income for the
latter by facilitating access to fishing permits and quotas, selling catches to outside
buyers, and issuing monetary advances. The tangible, immediete nature of these bene-
fits is especially significant to people living in a context of structural poverty. Thus, to
understand the phenomenon of brokerage in Ocean View and other communities living
in similar conditions of material deprivation and insecurity requires an explicit recogni-
tion of, and engagement with the substantive contribution that brokers make to local
livelihoods, income generation, and food security. On the other hand, the AOF leader-
ship provided economic benefits to their constituents in the context of a relationship of
‘personalised dependency’ and unequal power that can ultimately be seen to undermine
constituents’ long-term economic interests. When community-based fisher representa-
tion is co-opted into a form of brokerage, fisher constituents have minimal agency in
the sale of their catches, and often receive unfavourable prices because their marketing
agreements are negotiated by broker-representatives concerned primarily with the
pursuit of self-interest. Moreover, fishers’ agency is constrained by their financial in-
debtedness to broker-representatives who have provided them with monetary advances.
While these advances bring short-term benefit to fishers in financial need, they estab-
lish a debtor-creditor relationship that ultimately compromises fishers’ long-term
economic interests. The economic interests of non-constituent fishers are also directly
affected, most evidently through the loss of scarce opportunities to access fishing
permits and quotas when these are intercepted by broker-representatives.
Community-based broker-representation also has implications for state fisheries man-
agement officials. To manage inshore fisheries effectively, officials must make decisions
on the basis of detailed and accurate information about realities on the ground among
fishing communities, including fundamental issues such as local fishing practices, patterns
of regulatory compliance, and fisheries resource dynamics. Fishers are the principal
holders of such information. However, when seeking to access the ground level informa-
tion held by fishers, management officials usually engage with community-based
representatives, rather than engaging directly with fishers. In instances where community-
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based representation manifests as brokerage by local elites, the information that manage-
ment officials obtain from these representatives is likely to be unreliable, directly com-
promising the ability of officials to make decisions that correspond with realities on the
ground. Conversely, the opaque mediation of broker-representatives has the effect of
subverting attempts by officials to communicate crucial governance and management-
related information to fishers on the ground.
Finally, the dark side of community-based representation has implications for the
analysis and theorisation of fisheries governance. As discussed in the introduction, syn-
ergetic theoretical approaches such as co-management, interactive governance, and
ecosystem-based management posit the desirability and viability of a governance model
in which fishers, fisheries management officials, scientists and other actors engage
collaboratively as partners. However, the tendency of synergetic theory to valorise col-
laborative partnership leads to a vision of fisheries governance that elides the role of
asymmetrical power and realpolitik practices. In the context of community-based rep-
resentation, the effect is to predispose the observer to de-emphasise or overlook the
dark side latent within this vital institutional link in the chain of fisheries governance,
and how the manifestation of this dark side in the form of brokerage by local elites
might jeopardise the practical feasibility of collaborative engagement between fishers
and external actors.
The Ocean View case affirms the need for fisheries governance theory to focus
greater attention on the phenomenon of community-based broker-representation. This
is particularly important because the micro-political practices, power relations and
conditions illustrated in the Ocean View case are present in many other coastal com-
munities in South Africa, and in the Global South more broadly.
While synergetic theoretical approaches make an important contribution towards the
formulation of new modes of fisheries governance that are more inclusive, de-centred
and participatory than conventional modes of governance, there is reason to argue that
the explanatory and policy utility of these theoretical approaches is compromised by
their valorisation of collaborative partnership. To better understand the fraught polit-
ical realities of community-based representation–a microcosm of the larger, multi-scale
governance system–requires the pursuit of a theoretical perspective that directly inter-
rogates the power relations and strategic practices that are fundamental in shaping the
nature and outcomes of fisheries governance processes.
Endnotes
1The term ‘fisher’ is used broadly here, and unless otherwise specified, it refers to
people who personally catch fish for a living.
2‘Realpolitik’ is defined here simply as: self-interested, zero-sum political strategy and action.
3It should be explicitly recognised that the apartheid-era racial categories of ‘white’,
‘coloured’, ‘black’ and ‘Indian’ are social constructs. Yet these racial categories continue
to find expression in popular discourse, and in South Africa’s policy and legislative
frameworks. The racial category of ‘coloured’ was used by the apartheid state to refer
to Afrikaans-speaking people who resided mainly in the Cape region, and who were
deemed neither ‘white’ nor ‘black’ due to their mixed racial ancestry (Adhikari 2005).
4The concept ‘bona fide fisher’ is widely used in the context of small-scale fisheries
governance in South Africa. Though it is a subjective and contested concept, ‘bona fide
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fisher’ features as the fundamental unit of governance in South Africa’s new small-scale
fisheries paradigm, as mandated by the Small-Scale Fishing Policy (2012). This concept
has also been incorporated into the discourse of small-scale fishers and other residents
in marginalised coastal communities.
5Two fishers from Ocean View who participated in this research were named as
Applicants in the Equality Court case.
6DAFF implemented interim relief through the allocation of annual fishing permits to
roughly 1500 people in the Western Cape and Northern Cape Provinces who were identi-
fied as small-scale fishers. These permits were not allocated in the Eastern Cape and
KwaZulu-Natal Provinces, because access to fisheries resources is governed under the au-
thority of provincial conservation management agencies, rather than under the authority
of the national fisheries department (as is the case in the other two coastal provinces).
7Bourdieu’s conception of ‘capital’ pre-dates, and is distinct from the conception of
‘capital’ employed in the context of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework. The latter
presents a conception of capital reduced to an instrumental ‘asset’ for meeting basic
material needs (epitomized by the problematic neoliberal notion of ‘natural capital’),
while also de-emphasising structural asymmetries of power and political contestation in
the distribution of capitals between different actors at the household, local, national
and global scale. In contrast with the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, Bourdieu’s
conception of capital is founded on an agonistic view of social relations, and is thus
fundamentally political: crucially, he posits that an individual’s specific set of symbolic
and material capacities (or capitals) is a direct function of the multi-scale, structural
power relations in which that individual is embedded.
8It should be emphasised here that the term ‘wealth’ is relative to the socio-economic
context in Ocean View.
9The names of all organisations and individuals have been changed to ensure their
anonymity.
10The DFO was established in 1995 (having evolved from an earlier organisation
formed in 1992), with both its leadership and constituency being composed of bona
fide fishers. This organisation played a central role in the political representation of
fishers in Ocean View since the start of the post-apartheid era, but in late 2010, the
DFO’s elected leadership were deposed in an alleged coup by the AOF leadership, who
then took over the formal positions of DFO executive chairperson and deputy chairper-
son. With the elected leadership removed from formal office, the DFO was effectively
rendered inactive.
11Their specific government positions have been withheld for the sake of maintaining
their anonymity.
12This fisher sadly passed away due to ill health during the period of this research.
His death was deeply mourned by Ocean View’s fishing community.
Acknowledgments
The author wishes to acknowledge the National Research Foundation for their generous funding support. The author
also wishes to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their rigorous and constructive comments. Finally, the author
wishes to acknowledge the Ocean View fishers who so kindly contributed their time and knowledge to this research.
Author’s contributions
OJS is the sole author, and conducted the research upon which the paper is based.
Competing interests
The author declares that he has no competing interests.
Schultz Maritime Studies  (2017) 16:7 Page 20 of 21
Received: 14 September 2016 Accepted: 20 February 2017
References
Abraham, A., and J.P. Platteau. 2000. The central dilemma of decentralized rural development. In Paper presented at the
Conference on New Institutional Theory, Institutional Reform, and Poverty Reduction, 7–8. London: London School of
Economics.
Acheson, J.M. 1981. Anthropology of Fishing. Annual Review of Anthropology 10: 275–316.
Adhikari M. 2005. Not white enough, not black enough: racial identity in the South African coloured community.
Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.
Bavinck, M., R. Chuenpagdee, M. Diallo, P. van der Heijden, J. Kooiman, R. Mahon, and Williams S. 2005. Interactive
fisheries governance: a guide to better practice. Centre for Maritime Studies (MARE). Amsterdam. Delft: Eburon
Academic Publishers.
Bene, C., and A.E. Neiland 2006. From participation to governance: a critical review of the concepts of governance, co-
management and participation, and their implementation in small-scale inland fisheries in developing countries. Report
for the WorldFish Centre and the CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food.
Berkes, F. 2012. Implementing ecosystem-based management: evolution or revolution? Fish and Fisheries 13: 465–476.
Berkes, F., R.M. Mahon, R. Pollnac, and R. Pomeroy. 2001. Managing Small-scale Fisheries, Alternative Directions and
Methods. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.
Blaikie, P. 2006. Is small really beautiful? Community-based natural resource management in Malawi and Botswana.
World Development 34(11): 1942–1957.
Bond, P. 2003. Against global apartheid: South Africa meets the World Bank, IMF and international finance. London:
Palgrave McMillan.
Bond, P. 2005. Elite transition: from apartheid to neoliberalism in South Africa. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu
Natal Press.
Bourdieu, P. 1986. The forms of capital. In Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education, ed. J.
Richardson, 241–258. New York: Greenwood Press.
Bourdieu, P. 1989. Social space and symbolic power. Sociological Theory 7(1): 14–25.
Bourdieu, P. 2005. Political, social and journalistic fields. In Bourdieu and the journalistic field, ed. R. Benson and E. Neveu,
29–46. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.
Davis, A., and K. Ruddle. 2012. Massaging the misery: recent approaches to fisheries governance and the betrayal of
small-scale fisheries. Human Organization 71(3): 244–254.
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). 2012. Policy for the small-scale fisheries sector in South Africa.
Pretoria: Government Gazette No. 35455.
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 1995. Code of conduct for responsible fisheries. Rome: Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations.
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 2015. Voluntary guidelines for securing sustainable small-scale fisheries in the
context of food security and poverty eradication. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
Hara, M.M. 2014. Analysis of South African commercial traditional linefish snoek value chain. Marine Resource Economics
29(3): 279–299.
Hauck, M., and M. Kroese. 2006. Fisheries compliance in South Africa: a decade of challenges and reform 1994–2004.
Marine Policy 30(1): 74–83.
Hersoug, B. and Isaacs M. 2001. “It’s all about money!” Implementation of South Africa’s new fisheries policy. Land reform
and agrarian change in Southern Africa. Occasional Paper no. 18. Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies,
University of the Western Cape, Cape Town.
Isaacs, M. 2006. Small-scale fisheries reform: expectations, hopes and dreams of “a better life for all”. Marine Policy 30: 51–59.
Isaacs, M. 2013. Small-scale fisheries governance and understanding the snoek (thyrsites atun) supply chain in the
Ocean View fishing community, Western Cape, South Africa. Ecology and Society 18(4): 17–27.
James, D. 2011. The return of the broker: consensus, hierarchy, and choice in South African land reform. Journal of the
Royal Anthropological Institute 17(2): 318–338.
McGoodwin, J.R. 1980. Mexico’s marginal inshore Pacific fishing cooperatives. Anthropological Quarterly Special Issue
(Maritime Anthropology) 53(1): 39–47.
Mikalsen, K.H., and S. Jentoft. 2003. Limits to participation? On the history, structure and reform of Norwegian fisheries
management. Marine Policy 27: 397–407.
Mosse, D., and D. Lewis. 2006. Theoretical approaches to brokerage and translation in Development. In Development
brokers and translators: The ethnography of aid and agencies, ed. D. Mosse and D. Lewis, 1–26. London: Kumarian.
Petterson, J.S. 1980. Fishing cooperatives and political power: a Mexican example. Anthropological Quarterly Special Issue
(Maritime Anthropology) 53(1): 64–74.
Ribot, J.C. 1999. Decentralization participation and accountability in Sahelian forestry legal instruments of political
administrative control. Africa 69(1): 23–65.
Sowman, M. 2006. Subsistence and small-scale fisheries in South Africa: a ten year review. Marine Policy 30(1): 60–73.
Sowman, M., J. Sunde, S. Raemaekers, and O. Schultz. 2014. Fishing for equality: policy for poverty alleviation for South
Africa’s small-scale fisheries. Marine Policy 46: 31–42.
van Sittert, L. 1995. The handmaiden of industry: marine science and fisheries development in South Africa 1895–1939.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 26(4): 531–558.
van Sittert, L. 2002. “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”: comparing fisheries reforms
in South Africa. Marine Policy 26: 295–305.
van Sittert, L., G. Branch, M. Hauck, and M. Sowman. 2006. Benchmarking the first decade of post-apartheid fisheries
reform in South Africa. Marine Policy 30: 96–110.
Schultz Maritime Studies  (2017) 16:7 Page 21 of 21
